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ABSTRACT The increasing number of devices in the age of Internet-of-Thing (IoT) has arisen a number of
problems related to security. Cryptographic processes, more precisely the signatures and the keys, increase
and generate an overhead on the network resources with these huge connections. Therefore, in this paper
we present a signcryption framework to address the above problems. The solution highlights the use of
aggregate signcryption and certificaless approach based on bilinear pairings. The use of signcryption with
aggregation and certificateless authentication reduces the time consumption, overhead and complexity. The
solution is also able to solve the key staling problems. Experimental results and comparative analysis based
on key parameters, memory utilization and bandwidth utilization have been measured. It confirms that the
presented work is efficient for IoT infrastructure.
INDEX TERMS Authentication, signature, signcryption, security, IoT, confidentiality.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet-of-Thing (IoT) is a technology enabler in present
world. It derives an ecosystem made up of people, pro-
cess and technology; with more insights, the infrastructure
of IoTs uses web enabled smart devices with embedded
systems, cloud storages, underlying internet structure and
applications used by the users [1]. The objectives of mak-
ing life smoother and easier have craved the pathway of
IoT in out technology. It is able to shape both the indus-
trial and consumer worlds. The advantages of IoTs have
showed potentials in various domains such as healthcare,
agriculture, finance, logistics, supply chains, education and
many more [2]. With the increasing number of applications
and forecasting of increased device connections also posing
severe challenges [3]. Security is one of the major concerns
among the all [4], [5].
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Muhammad Imran .
Inheriting the security problems of wireless networks, IoT
also faces some severe security issues such as: authentication
attacks, denial-of-services, camouflages, espionages, routing
attacks and others [6]. Authentication attacks take another
dimension in IoT where heterogeneous devices are connected
to the network. Therefore, the security mechanism should be
strict enough to provide sufficient strength to the network
without reducing the performance. Such a solution for IoT
security has been provided in the present work. In the follow-
ing subsections discussion is made on some background of
the existing security mechanism and technology and relevant
security derivations in recent years.
A. BACKGROUND OF SECURITY
Security is defined by a logical interpretation of being
free from threats. It is obvious in this present world of
internet technology that the attacks are present everywhere
and making strategies for gaining access to the network
data. Therefore, it is required that any system requires
some security parameters to be obtained by using security
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tools. In IoT perspectives, the security requirements are as
follows [7].
Confidentiality: The data in communication should not be
accessed by a third party.
Authentication: The sender and receiver must prove their
identity for data access.
Integrity: The data sent by the sender should be received
by the receiver without any modification or alteration.
Non-repudiation: The sender or the receiver cannot deny
about their responsibility of sending or receiving the data.
Availability: The data should be available always by the
authenticated users in the network whenever and wherever
required.
Apart from these access control and accountability are
also required for IoT to manage the network properly.
To accomplish these requirements cryptographic protocols
are used rigorously. Hash functions, symmetric/asymmetric
key cryptography, digital signatures are used by all the IoT
infrastructures [8]. Such cryptographic functionalities make
security backbone overall and therefore, such algorithms
need to be robust enough. Encryption techniques provide
confidentiality, digital signatures provide integrity, authenti-
cation and non-repudation. In generic security frameworks,
these two techniques are processed separately. However,
researches have been conducted to integrate these two in
single logical step and thus, signcryption processes come into
existence in cryptography [9].
B. SIGNCRYPTION, AGGREGATES AND RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS
Signcryption, as single logical step for digital signature and
encryption, is able to reduce the computational costs and
communication overheads as compared with the traditional
signature-then-encryption schemes. Correctness, efficiency,
security in terms of forward secrecy, unforgeability are some
of the essential features of signcryption [10]. Various sign-
cryption algorithms have been developed in recent years.
A standard model of signcryption is shown in [11]. Vari-
ous hyper elliptic curve based signcryption techniques are
researched which prove their efficiency in terms of secu-
rity [12]. Some other significant use of signcryption in
various IoT based infrastructures are also worth mention-
ing [13]–[20]. To enhance the performance of signcryptions
blockchain based signcryption is also derived [21]. With the
need of post quantum resistance, lattices are introduced in
signcryption [22].
The successful implementation of signcryption for reduc-
ing computation and communication overhead in IoTs has
been processed forward by aggregating the signatures. Signa-
ture aggregation schemes allowmultiple signatures generated
by multiple public keys for multiple messages to be aggre-
gated into a single signature and verified accordingly [23].
Various aggregate signature schemes are researched in recent
times. Significant use of aggregate signatures in vehicular ad
hoc networks are observed [24], [25]. Another such scheme
for healthcare-based application is researched [26].
Aggregation schemes can be enhanced further by doing
aggregations on the overall signcryptions. The objective
of providing required security with reduced overhead and
computation has led to such developments. An obfuscating
aggregate signcryption development for IoT is worth men-
tioning here [27]. An application specific use of signcryption
aggregation is shown in [28] Another recent construction of
such aggregation is shown in [29]. The algorithms shown
in [27]–[29] are chosen for the comparison with the proposed
certificateless scheme. Emphasizing on the last three research
works, some problems are identified. Firstly, the algorithms
of [27] and [28] are unable to provide a certificateless scheme
therefore, having a scope of improvement with certificateless
schemes. Secondly, key staling is a problem in all these three
algorithms. These identified problems have motivated us to
find a signcryption solution for IoT framework.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
explain the proposed approach/scheme detailing about the
preliminaries and phase wise descriptions with algorithms.
Section III explains the experimental results, comparative
analysis and security validation. Section IV concludes the
paper highlighting the major findings of the experiment.
II. PROPOSED CASCF SCHEME
In this section, we explain the problem definition, preliminar-
ies used for the proposed scheme, networkmodel followed by
the detailed description of the functions.
A. PROBLEM DEFINITION
In IoTs, the devices are connected over Internet. IoT commu-
nication is affected by various security issues. To safeguard
the data of IoT devices in communication and to provide
the required security services cryptography solutions have
become integral part. Hence, the present work shows a solu-
tion for the IoTs. It ensures confidentiality, authentication,
integrity and non-repudiation services. The solution objecti-
fies the following.
• To reduce the time consumption by using signcryption
method
• To reduce the overhead by the cryptographic processes
by using aggregate signcryption.
• To reduce the complexity of certificates by using certifi-
cateless approach
B. PRELIMINARIES
LetG1 andG2 be the cyclic groups of same order q whereG1
is additive group and G2 is multiplicative group. A bilinear
map e: G1 × G2 → Ge is a function such that ∀u ∈ G1 and
∀v ∈ G2; a, b ∈ Z it has the following [30]:
e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab (1)
These maps are also called as bilinear pairings as they asso-
ciate the elements of G1 and G2 to the elements of Ge.
Assuming g1 and g2 be the group generators of G1 and
G2 respectively, the admissible bilinear map is admissible
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if e(g1, g2) is able to generate the elements of Ge and e is
efficiently computable. Such admissible mapping should also
possess the property of non-degeneracy and computability as
defined below.
1) NON-DEGENERACY
A bilinear map e : G1 × G2 → Ge is non-degenerate if it
satisfies the conditions:
1) Ker(e) = 0; e(u, v) = 0 ∀ u ∈ G1 implies v =
0 and vice versa
2) dim G1 = dim G2
2) COMPUTABILITY
There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(g1, g2),
for g1 ∈ G1 and g2 ∈ G2.
3) COMPUTATIONAL DIFFIE-HELLMAN (CDH) PROBLEM
For a cyclic group G of order q, CDH states that: For a given
(g, ga, gb) with any random generator g ∈ G and random
a, b ∈ Zq, it is computationally intractable to compute gab.
4) DECISIONAL BILINEAR DIFFIE-HELLMAN (DBDH)
PROBLEM
Let G be cyclic group of order q and with generator g. For
a given ga and gb with uniformly and independently chosen
a, b ∈ Zq, it is to be calculated gab is random in G.
5) GAP DIFFIE-HELLMAN (GDH) PROBLEM
Let G be cyclic group of order q and with generator g. Given,
(ga, gb) ∈ G1 with unknown a, b ∈ Zq, then compute gab ∈
G1 with the help of DBDH oracle.
C. SYSTEM MODEL
In the proposed scheme, two Raspberry Pi, three minicom-
puters, five mobile phones and one desktop are considered to
develop the IoT model. One Raspberry Pi 3 is made as client
model and it is connected with DHT-11 and MQ-135 sensors
to collect the environmental data (experimental room). This
data is signed and forwarded to another Raspberry Pi 3 model
which acts as a server for the sensor network capability.
Mobile phones are working as end devices. The desktop
is working as a server where the sensor network server is
also connected and the verification of the message is carried
out here. Table-1 summarizes some important notations and
symbols used in the proposed work and Figure 1 shows the
system model carried out.
D. FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION
The proposed scheme follows the work shown in [29]. The
scheme involves the prime entities: Key Generation Center
(KGC), a sender us and receiver ur , an aggregating set a of n
users and Aggregate Signcryption Generator (ASG). KGC is
responsible for generating keys. Sender and receiver are the
parts of communicating nodes where us, ur ∈ a. ASG creates
TABLE 1. List of important notations and symbols.
FIGURE 1. System Model for the proposed scheme showing the
connection between end devices (sensor, mobiles) via router and gateway
to internet.
the final signcryption and validates the incoming signcryp-
tions. The modifications in the existing algorithm [29] deals
with the changes in the key generation process andmaster key
creation. Subsequently, we obtain an improved framework
for IoT signcryption. However, we have followed the same
stages of execution as shown in the above mentioned process.
The proposed framework modules are shown in Figure 2. The
functioning of the scheme is sub categorized as: Setup, Partial
private key extract, User key generate, Signcrypt, Aggregate,
Aggregate verify and Aggregate unsigncrypt. Some of the
assumptions made for the scheme are:
• KGC is secure and trusted.
• Aggregation of signcryptions are done by a special mod-
ule ASG linking to a set of users separately.
• Aggregate unsigncryption is done by the receiver.
The detailed functioning of the scheme in the IoT framework
is shown below.
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FIGURE 2. The framework for the proposed scheme showing the viability
of KGC and ASG in fog layer for better computation aspect.
1) SETUP
This function is processed by KGC. It inputs a random point
on an elliptic curve E over a finite field Zq with an order o =
qk where, random prime number q and k is an integer, and
the other two integer elements a, b such that: y2 = x3+ ax+
b, (a, b) < q. It then stores the master secret key (msk) with
itself and publishes system parameters (param) as shown in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Set Up
1: Input: y2 = x3 + ax + b
2: Output: msk , param
3: Obtain a cyclic additive groupG1 fromZq of prime order
q with generator g1
4: Obtain the non-zero elements ofZq to generate the cyclic
multiplicative group G2. The order of this group should
be q and generator is g2.
5: e: G1 × G1→ G2
6: Select a random number r ∈ Z∗q → msk,G1 ⊆ Z∗q
7: Master public key (mpk) = r .g1.g2
8: Initialize the hash functions
H1 : {0, 1}∗→ G1 and H2 : {0, 1}∗→ {0, 1}k
9: Store r and publish
param : {G1,G2, e, g1, g2,mpk,H1,H2}
2) PARTIAL PRIVATE KEY GENERATION
Once the system parameters are set up, KGC initializes the
process of key generation for the users registering for the
network. KGC takes input param,msk , the identity of the user
IDui registering for the network and timestamp t of 128 bits.
Timestamp helps for preventing stale or revocation of keys.
Note that, the proposed scheme uses ICMetrics to generate
the identity of the users and converted them into 128-bit
binary representation: IDui = {0, 1}128 [31]. This identity is
generated by an individual user. KGC returns a partial private
key P̂rui for the user ui through an assumed secure channel.
The process is shown in Algorithm-2.
Algorithm 2 Partial Private Key Generation
1: Input: param,msk, IDui
2: Output: P̂rui
3: Compute Qi = H1(IDui )
4: P̂rui = H1[(msk.Qi)||(t + δt)]
5: Return P̂rui
3) USER KEY PAIR GENERATION
After getting the partial private key from KGC, each user
executes a process to generate public-private key pair. The
process inputs param and user’s identity IDui . It outputs a
private key Prui and a corresponding public key Puui for
the user ui. The private key is kept secret with the user
and the public key is shared without any certification. The
process is summarized in Algorithm 3. Signcrypt: Whenever
Algorithm 3 User Key Pair Generation
1: Input: param, P̂rui
2: Output: {P̂uui , P̂rui}
3: Choose a random number ru ∈ Z∗q
4: Prui = P̂rui .ru
5: Puui = ru.g1.g2
6: return {Prui ,Puui}
a registered user ui wants to communicate, it executes the
process of signcryption. The process takes inputs of param,
some state information 4, message M, identity of the its
own IDui , public key Puui , private key Prui , the identity of
the receiver IDur and its corresponding public key Puur . The
process outputs a signcrypted message C. The process is
shown in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Signcryption
1: Input: param,4,M, IDui ,Puui ,Prui , IDur ,Puur
2: Output: C
3: Choose a random number ri ∈ Z∗q
4: Compute Ui = r2.g1.g2
5: Compute Qur = H1(IDur ||t)
6: Compute Ti = e(mpk,Qur )r2
7: Compute hi = H2(Ui,Ti, ri,Puur ,4)
8: Compute Vi = hi ⊕M
9: Compute Hi = H1(Ui,Vi, IDui ,Puui , IDur ,
Puur )
10: Compute H4 = H1(4)
11: Compute Wi = riHi + ruH4
12: return C : {Ui,Vi,Wi}
4) AGGREGATE
Aggregate SigncryptionGenerator (ASG) follows the process
of aggregation. It inputs an aggregating set a of n users, some
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state information 4, the identity of senders IDui and their
public keys Puui , signcrypted ciphertexts Ci. It outputs an
aggregate ciphertext C. The process is shown in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 Aggregation
1: Input: a,4, IDui ,Puui , Ci, IDur
2: Output: C
3: W =∑ni=1Wi, i = 1, 2, .., n ∈ a
4: Combine Ui
5: Combine Vi
6: C = {U1, ..,Un,V1, ..,Vn,W }
7: Transmit C
5) AGGREGATE VERIFY
Any receiver who is receiving C is able to verify the aggre-
gated signcryption. For this, the inputs the receiver needs
appropriate public keys of the receivers for which that C is
generated. The adversaries are unable to verify because the
lack of key components availability. It compares the outputs
and process further to unsigncryption if the comparison is
valid else connection is aborted. The process is shown in
Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6 Aggregate Verification
1: Input: a, IDui ,Puui , IDur ,Puur ,4, C
2: Output: Accept or Discard
3: For i = 1 to n do
ComputeHi = H1(Ui,Vi, IDui ,Puui , IDur ,Puur ) End do
4: Compute H ′4 = H1(4)
5: Compute I1 = e(W ,Puui )
6: Compute
I2 = e(∑ni=1 Qi,mpk)∏ni=1 e(Hi,Ui)e(H ′4,∑ni=1 Puui )
7: if (I1 = I2)
then accept C
else
discard and abort
8: return NULL
6) AGGREGATE UNSIGNCRYPT
Once the verification is done for C, the receiver executes
the unsigncryption process. The receiver uses C, the state
information 4, identity IDur and its public-private key pair
{Puur ,Prur }, all the senders’ identities IDui and their corre-
sponding public keysPuui and outputs n number of plaintexts.
The unsigncryption process is shown in Algorithm 7.
The overall scheme is summarized in Figure 3.
It shows the connection between KGC, users (sender
and receiver) and ASG. The numbers in the figure
represents the sequence of operation in the presented
work.
Algorithm 7 Aggregate Unsigncryption
1: Input: : C,4, IDur ,Puur ,Prur , IDui ,Puui
2: Output: {M1,M2, ..,Mn}
3: For i = 1 to n do
4: Compute Ti = e(Ui, P̂rur )
5: Compute hi = H2(Ui,Ti, rurUi, IDur ,
Prur ,4)
6: ComputeMi = Vi ⊕ hi
7: return {M1,M2, ..,Mn}
8: End do
FIGURE 3. Sequence of operations among the framework modules:
sender, receiver, KGC and ASG.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, performance of the proposed scheme has been
measured. The scheme is also compared with the existing
schemes shown in [27][28] and [29]. Performance metrics,
comparative analysis and security analysis are shown in the
following subsections.
A. PERFORMANCE METRICS
Performance of the schemes are measured based on the fol-
lowing metrics.
1) THROUGHPUT
Throughput is defined as the number of messages success-
fully delivered per unit time. In this case, we have assumed
that, the network throughput is fixed and measurement is
done only for the message signcryption functions. It has been
measured in bits/seconds.
2) DELAY
It is defined as the round-trip time in the network. Gen-
erally, delay is comprised of processing delay, queuing
delay,transmission delay and propagation delay. Assuming
that all the other delays are static, only processing delay has
been measured and compared.
3) ENERGY CONSUMPTION
IoT is comprised of devices which are resource constrained.
Therefore, the schemes developed for IoT security should
provide less energy consumption. This metric is mea-
sured with residual energy parameter and represented in
percentage.
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FIGURE 4. Throughput comparison among CASCF and other approaches.
4) MEMORY CONSUMPTION
This metric is measured in terms of kilobytes required for
overall storage of keys, intermediate values and certificates
(wherever the comparison approaches use certificates)
5) COMPLEXITY
The complexity of the schemes is measured in their individual
operation complexity basis. The less complex algorithms are
more suitable for IoT framework.
B. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
For the experimentation, we have used overall 5000messages
in the network setup as shown in Figure-1. Memory in KGC
is maintained with 8GB RAM configuration and 1GB ROM
separately only for aggregate signcryption process. Message
size has been varied from 10 KB to 2MB with average size of
1000KB. The comparative result is shown in Figure-4. The
result shows that with the increasing number of messages
(number of bits), the performance of the schemes degrades.
However, in comparison the degradation in the proposed
scheme is less. It shows that CASCF is able to produce
28.3%, 43.6%, and 17.9% better throughput as compared
to the schemes in [27],[28] and [29] respectively. The rea-
son behind this throughput behaviour of CASCF is the use
of certificate-less approach and reducing the number steps
involved in the processing as shown in the exiting schemes. In
the next experiment we have measured the processing delay
of the schemes. The size of the message does not affect the
cryptographic schemes. So, the delay is the overall processing
of the signcrypted message, aggregation and receiver’s aggre-
gate unsigncryption. This has been measured by subtracting
the queuing delay, transmission delay and propagation delay
from the roundtrip time where those delays are assumed
to be constant and the transmission channel is congestion
free. The delay output is shown in Figure-5. Figure-5 shows
that CASCF possess the reduced delay as compared to other
schemes. The certificateless signcryption creates an effect
on this as the delays for creating certificates and verifying
certificate are avoided here. The approach in [29] uses similar
FIGURE 5. Delay comparison among CASCF and other approaches.
FIGURE 6. Residual energy comparison among CASCF and other
approaches.
kind of certificateless approach and therefore having similar
kind of output. However, the reduction steps in CASCF pro-
duces less delay. Overall, CASCF is able to obtain 25% less
delay as compared to other algorithms.
Energy is another parameter which is very much important
in IoT framework. The measurement has been calculated as
the average residual energy of all the end devices cumula-
tively. The result is shown in Figure-6. The energy compari-
son shown in the Figure-6 depicts that the algorithms of [27]
and [28] have an average energy consumption 45% of the
total energy; however, at the beginning energy consumption
is more for [28] and after 3000 messages [27] degrades more
rapidly in residual energy. On the other hand, CASCF and
algorithm in [29] are better than the other two algorithms due
to the avoidance of certificates. Further, CASCF is more effi-
cient by changing the key generation mechanism by reduc-
ing the energy consumption by 48%, 49.7% and 15.6% as
compared to [27]–[29] respectively. Memories are important
for any cryptographic process. With the increasing number of
messages, it is obvious that individual memory consumption
increases but in comparison results show that CASCF is more
advantageous in term of memory as the consuming memory
amount is less in the work. The other three algorithms show
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FIGURE 7. Residual energy comparison among CASCF and other
approaches.
TABLE 2. Parameters for measuring complexity.
memory usage of 25%, 36% and 18% more than the CASCF.
Therefore, in view of memory utilization CASCF proves its
efficiency. The comparison result is shown in Figure-7.
The measurement of the complexity has been done in two
parts: receiver side computational complexity and communi-
cation complexity. We have followed the similar parameters
and notation for this metric as mentioned in [29]. The nota-
tions are summarized in Table-2 and the comparison is shown
in Table-3.
Table-3 shows that the communication complexity is less
as compared to the schemes describe in [27] and [28];
however, [29] and CASCF show the similar kind of com-
munication complexity. On the other hand, for sender side
complexity is more for CASCF but receiver side computation
complexity and aggregator computation complexity are the
least among the all. As an overall, CASCF is efficient in terms
of complexity of computation and communication cost.
C. SECURITY VALIDATION
The security analysis of CASCF with IoT infrastructure is
explained here. The analysis consists of discussion about
the Diffie-Hellman problems and other security features as
required. CASCF uses the same attacker adversary model
with challenge response game to validate the Diffie-Hellman
assumptions [29]. However, we have provided an intuitive
discussion to validate the work. As before the aggregation,
the base is signcryption, we have not included any explicit
discussion of signcryption security as it is mentioned in [32].
1) DIFFIE-HELLMAN PROBLEMS
We have analysed a reduction for CDH as if gan is solvable
from a given ga, then CDH problem is solvable. Let A be
an adversary that uses ga for random a and outputs ga2 with
a probability P. A construction is made as A′who receives
u = ga and v = gb and works as follows. A′ runs A for n
times on input u, v and u.v. IfA returns correct answer every
time thenA′ haveA = gan, B = gbn and C = g(a+b)n. Thus,
A′ gives output as n
√
C
A.B where, n
√ is the prime modulo
q. The probability of this calculation if it is correct for a
random generator g and unknown a, b becomes: Pn,where
P =
∏n
(i=1) P(g)∑n
(i=1)
∏
a.
∏
b → 0. It validates that the proposed scheme
is intractable under CDH problem.
Similarly, for DBDH, we first try to calculate the advan-
tage for the adversary A. It takes a quadruple input as:
(g, ga, gb, gab) and attempts to get the advantage of getting a
random gabc inG. If a, b are chosen uniformly with a random
c in G, the correlation to make gabc will be difficult. The
probability of such advantage for A is given as:
Adv(A) = |P(Adv(g, ga, gb, gab)− P(Adv(g, ga, gb, gc)|;
g← e : {Gn × Gn}; {a, b, c} ← Z∗q (2)
For, the polynomial time-based systems like the proposed
scheme, the advantage becomes zero. This infers that the
CASCF is unable to solve DBDH, and hence it is safe. Now,
extending the CDH problem with a random oracle, the GDH
validation is conducted as mentioned in [29]. For an attacker
Å, it uses the proposed scheme with a master public key mpk
with a generator ga and a random number l 6 qH1 , where
H1 is the oracle and q is the maximum number of iterations
in oracle and receives a GDH tuple (g, ga, gb) in G1 from an
adversary A. Å sends A : G1,G2, e, g,mpk . As the queries
allowed for Å is only H1 therefore, for H2 queries it checks
if DBDH is true and checks if e(U ,Pu) = e(U , g); if it is true
and the tuple exist with a value of h, Å returns it or chooses
a random h, updates itself and sends to A. A then sends
identities of the uses, public keys, and the messages, a forged
ciphertext C∗ and some state information. Each identity to
be chosen from the set of n identities having the same prob-
ability. Moreover, the aggregate verification process should
also return true on the forged aggregated signcryptedmessage
which leads for Å to calculate gab. This ensures that the
proposed scheme is secure against GDH assumption.
2) OTHER SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
a: CORRECTNESS
The following equality proves the verifiable correctness of
the proposed work.
e(W , g)
= e(
n∑
i=1
Wi, g)
= e
( n∑
i=1
(P̂rui + riHi + ruH4), g
)
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TABLE 3. Comparison of complexity.
= e
(( n∑
i=1
H1(msk.Qi) ↑ Extract(t+δt)+ riHi+ruH4
)
, g
)
= e
( n∑
i=1
Qi,mpk
) n∏
i=1
e(Hi,Ui)e(H ′4,
n∑
i=1
Puui ) (3)
b: UNFORGEABILITY
The proposed CASCF in signcryption mode is unforgeable
against adaptive chosen message attacks. Two cases are con-
sidered here. A challenge-response game is initiated as men-
tioned in [33]. A challengerC generates the public parameters
param and msk by executing the setup algorithm. It sends
param to an adversaryA′.A′ then performs series of queries
and outputs (ID′us , ID
′
ur , δ
′). In this, it is to be assured thatA′
has not extracted the partial private key as it uses a random
number and timestamp with hash. Another assumption is that
for the chosen message,A′ is unable to use set keys or private
key queries on ID′us . As a result, The output of aggregation
verification is false andA′ is unable to proceed further. In an
extensive scenario, if A′ is able to input a forged ciphertext
C in the aggregation, it cannot retract the key pairs as the
challenger C wins the game by prohibiting A′ from getting
the partial private key or replacing the public keys.
c: INTRACTABILITY
Intractability of the proposed CASCF is discussed through
CDH and GDH assumptions.
d: FORWARD SECRECY
CASCF ensures the property of forward secrecy. In our
scheme, if the master secret key msk of a KGC is compro-
mised, the attacker is able to get the partial secret key but
unable to obtain the private key of the user as it is generated
with msk and a random number. This random number is user
specific and secret too. Therefore, to generate the private key,
the attacker needs the random number ru, which is private to
the user only. Thus, generation of private key is infeasible.
Furthermore, timestamp is added to generate the keys which
preserves the freshness of the secret key. The above discus-
sion clearly says that the proposed scheme is secure.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the present work, a solution for IoT security has been
shown. It uses the aggregate signcryption to enhance the
network performance. Bilinear map is used in scheme. More-
over, timestamp is used in key generation process to obtain the
freshness of the keys. The framework uses a set of nodes as
aggregate signature generator. Most viably, it is to be used fog
layer of IoT infrastructure. Performance is measured based
on throughput, delay, energy consumption, memory con-
sumption. Results are compared with some existing schemes.
The complexities of the schemes are compared. Comparative
analysis infers that the proposed scheme is efficient for IoTs.
Moreover, security analysis confirms the accomplishment
of security objectives of the work. In the sender side, the
computation complexity is more which is considered as a
future objective.
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